Against reactionary populism: Towards a new public archaeology by González-Ruibal, Alfredo et al.
 1 
Authors´ response to comments by Reinhard Bernbeck & Susan Pollock, Yannis Hamilakis, Laurajane Smith & Gary Campbell, and 
Larry Z. Zimmerman on the paper “Against reactionary populism: Towards a new public archaeology”, published in Antiquity, Vol: 
92, Issue: 362, April 2018, pp. 507–515 (paper) & 525–27 (response). Doi response: https://doi.org/10.15184/aqy.2018.26 
Antiquity, Debate Section 
Authority vs power: capitalism, 
archaeology and the populist challenge 
versión 1.0.0, revisión 1 June 22, 2017 
Alfredo González-Ruibal*, Pablo Alonso González** & Felipe Criado-Boado* 
*Institute of Heritage Sciences (Incipit), Spanish National Research Council (CSIC); 
Avenida de Vigo s/n, 15705. Santiago de Compostela, Spain. 
**Instituto de Productos Naturales y Agrobiología (IPNA), Spanish National Research 
Council (CSIC); Avenida Astrofisico Francisco Sánchez, 3, 38206 San Cristóbal de La 
Laguna, Spain. 
**Author for correspondence; Email: pabloag10@hotmail.com 
 
We thank all of the commentators for raising crucial points that provide us with the 
opportunity to make important clarifications. Bernbeck and Pollock point out that in our 
work, only the people of the present matter, rather than those in the past. Although our 
discussion centres on living people, we also believe that the past is unfinished and that 
working with it allows us to build a different future. We also believe that archaeology has 
a responsibility towards the dead. We are, in a Derridean spirit, committed to “those 
others who are no longer or [...] not yet there, presently living, whether they are already 
dead or not yet born” (Derrida 2012: 18). There is, however, more than an ethical 
dimension to this; our plea for a new objectivity means that we are interested in the past 
qua past, not just in representations of the past in the present. This involves a form of 
knowledge that should not be confused with subjective or relativistic claims. Bernbeck 
and Pollock would surely agree with us upon Benjamin’s (1968: Thesis VI) words: 
To articulate what is past does not mean to recognize ‘how it really was’. It means to take 
control of a memory, as it flashes in a moment of danger […] The danger threatens the 
stock of tradition as much as its recipients. For both it is one and the same: handing itself 
over as the tool of the ruling classes.   
Bernbeck and Pollock are unconvinced by our argument concerning the coalition of 
predatory capitalism and reactionary populism. We agree that supporters of the latter are 
the victims of the former, but this does not mean that a dialectic that feeds back into itself 
is not actually in place. The American Rust Belt or the impoverished European working 
classes provide the voters, while neoliberalism, scapegoat politics (e.g. immigration, cuts 
in public expenditure) and economic policies leading to marginalisation, starvation and 
disease in turn produce more supporters of reactionary populism. In fact, political 
commentators today agree that while the current US President is entertaining the audience 
with populist rhetoric, corporations are performing better than ever. 
Finally, Bernbeck and Pollock argue that our idea of shifting from collaboration to 
provocation requires contextualisation. We would like to clarify that we are not 
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advocating for the abandonment of collaborative practices. There are contexts where 
provocation should be discounted for political, ethical or practical reasons. Collaboration, 
however, cannot be considered a panacea: sometimes provocation is a better option—for 
example, to raise a critical consciousness.  
Zimmerman posits that archaeologists in the USA have generally responded to the various 
populist pressures of the past century and have already started to enact what we suggest. 
This is true in many ways. It could, in fact, be argued that the practice of North American 
archaeologists is more radical than their discourse, which has all too often adopted the 
robes of multiculturalism. Still, the question of President Trump’s constituency has not, 
we think, been properly addressed. The extended experience of critical archaeology in the 
USA suggests, however, that US archaeologists will be prepared for the challenge. 
Concerning our notion that archaeology must ‘earn its keep’, we do argue that 
archaeology has to be socially relevant, but that this relevance should not be measured in 
economic terms, or as applied knowledge or customer satisfaction. We agree completely 
that we must change archaeology’s brand. The question is how to rebrand the discipline 
in a critical fashion, promoting its public appeal without trivialising it.  
Hamilakis reminds us that we still need to decolonise the discipline. He eloquently 
provides methods of doing this through temporality and an emphasis on affect, with which 
we fully agree. We support the idea, long defended by our Latin American colleagues 
(Haber 2016), that a decolonised archaeology can bring alternative modes of being 
beyond capitalism and the state. Our point, however, is that decolonising archaeology is 
insufficient: a rearming to face a capitalism that no longer requires scientific legitimacy—
because it dominates all other ideological, political and economic apparatuses—is badly 
needed. Hamilakis questions the geopolitics of our locality as southern Europeans. We 
do not, however, essentialise or mystify our geographic location as a pristine place of 
resistance; we understand our perspective as relational. Neither do we claim more 
legitimacy by emphasising our ‘subaltern’ position vis-a-vis the Anglophone academy. 
In doing so we would fall into the trap of epistemic populism ourselves! 
Concerning the issue of identity, we concur that gender and race cannot be disentangled 
from class and the genealogy of capitalist modernity. We must move away from the 
depoliticised multicultural identity politics that have so far prevailed, and that have left 
the structural homogeneity of capitalism intact. It is necessary to reinsert race, sex and 
gender into the political economy of capitalism. We oppose the critical energy spent in 
fighting for the recognition of reified forms of difference, which end up fuelling the 
populist capacity to create scapegoats and to gain public support. Regarding the 
universalising character of our proposal, emancipatory politics have always been 
universal in their aspirations, as is the decolonised archaeology proposed by Hamilakis. 
The problem is not universalism per se—it is defining what kind of universal values are 
defended. The universalism we advocate is counter to the fragmentation and localisation 
of struggles promoted by multiculturalism. 
Smith and Campbell accuse us of making a straw person argument against Critical 
Heritage Studies (CHS) before engaging in a straw fallacy themselves. Some of their 
criticisms are easy to dismiss. We never, for example, argued that there has been little 
examination of what “these marginalised communities think about archaeology and 
heritage” (above). There is, of course, much research on heritage and subaltern 
communities—but not those to which we refer: the supporters of, for example, President 
Trump, Brexit or European Far Right groups. More questionable is Smith and Campbell’s 
claim that we overlook the extensive literature on communities that recognises their 
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political diversity. The problem here is that these communities, while comprising a 
variety of interest groups that often disagree, are rarely portrayed as being fractured by 
irresolvable antagonisms. It is horizontal differences (typical of identity politics), rather 
than vertical antagonisms, that are emphasised (Žižek 2001).  
The two main points of contention concern the popular and teaching. Smith and Campbell 
argue that we share with conservative historians the same “long-standing discomfort in 
dealing with popular uses of the past” (above). If labels say more about those who need 
to label than about ourselves, then this is indeed very revealing of the assumptions and 
dichotomies with which CHS works: authorised vs non-authorised heritage, and experts 
vs the People. This allows no place for nuance: if you raise any criticism against the 
popular, you surely must be an authoritarian academic. The problem is that reality is more 
complex. We argue that the popular perspective cannot be taken as immediately correct 
(even superior) or impervious to criticism. Against the simple scenario where the virtuous 
People fight the evil expert, we observe a complex field of social relations and forms of 
knowledge-power, embedded in a global capitalist political economy. Furthermore, we 
certainly do not promulgate a ‘political programme’: this is not a manifesto. 
The same simplification occurs in their criticism about teaching. Here, Bernbeck and 
Pollock also raise a note of caution, arguing that we come close to reversing the gains of 
post-colonial archaeology. Smith and Campbell go a step further by accusing us of trying 
to reassert epistemic authoritarianism. We believe that our text has sufficient elements to 
dispel both the suspicion and the accusation. We fully embrace the post-colonial critique 
and admit that there are groups (e.g. indigenous peoples) from which archaeologists have 
much to learn. We reclaim a critical, non-authoritarian reconstruction of archaeological 
knowledge that is ready to face current social debates without having to plead for 
acceptance by the People. It is vital here to return to the anarchist distinction between 
authority, based on talent and knowledge, and power, based on the locus of enunciation 
and imposed through symbolic violence. We accept, of course, that teaching is a two-way 
street. We defend an archaeology that “learns in the process of educating” (above). Our 
feeling is that Smith and Campbell’s comment evinces a desire to retain authority within 
CHS, rather than engaging in a constructive debate that reckons with a new political 
scenario.  
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